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ABSTRACT
Countries going through democratic transition have to address how they will deal with the
human rights crimes committed during the authoritarian era. In the context of amnesty for
perpetrators, truth commissions have emerged as a standard institution to document the
violent past. Increasingly, claims are made that truth commissions have beneficial
psychological consequences; that is, that they facilitate 'catharsis', or 'heal the nation', or
allow the nation to 'work through' a violent past. This article draws upon trauma counseling
experience and anthropological fieldwork among survivors to challenge these claims in the
context of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It argues that nations
are not like individuals in that they do not have collective psyches, that nation-building
discourses on reconciliation often subordinate individual needs, and that truth commissions
and individual processes of healing work on different time lines. Calls for reconciliation
from national leaders may demand too much psychologically from survivors, and
retribution may be just as effective as reconciliation at creating symbolic closure.
Keywords: South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, symbolic closure, memory
We are meant to be a part of the process of the healing of our nation, of our people, all of
us, since every South African has to some extent or other been traumatised. We are a
wounded people...We all stand in need of healing (Archbishop Desmond Tutu in his
opening address to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission on December
16, 1995).
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)(1) has become the
paradigmatic international model of how to 'work through' a violent past and in so doing, to
'heal the nation'. Increasingly it is being argued that countries which have undergone large
scale conflict such as Bosnia, Rwanda and Northern Ireland need to set up similar truth
commissions. A country-wide process of revealing and confirming past wrongs is said to
facilitate a common and shared memory, and in so doing create a sense of unity and

reconciliation. By having this shared memory of the past, and a common identity as a
traumatised people, the country can, at least ideally, move on to a future in which the same
mistakes will not be repeated.
Yet the idea of dealing with the past through a national truth commission ascribes a
collective identity to a nation, and assumes that nations have psyches that experience
traumas in a similar way to individuals. This act of 'psychologising the nation' mistakenly
implies that the pursuit of national unity is a unitary and coherent process, and that
individual and national processes of dealing with the past are largely concurrent and
equivalent.
This chapter assesses the psychological impact on victims of the nation-building discourse of
truth commissions. It asks, to what degree does a nation undergo a uniform and collective
truth-telling experience? What are the consequences for individual subjectivities of asserting
that nations have psyches or collective consciences? This chapter argues that psychologizing
the nation can be an ideology for subordinating diverse individual needs to the political
expediency of national unity and reconciliation. Truth commissions aim to construct
memory as a unified, static and collective object, not as a political practice, or as a struggle
over the representation of the past that will continue to be vigorously contested after their
existence.
The discussion draws attention to a range of post-conflict societies (or those in some sort of
political transition) and explores the many divergences between individual psychological
processes and national processes of remembering such as truth commissions. We conclude
that the nation-building discourse of truth commissions homogenize disparate individual
memories to create an official version, and in so doing they repress other forms of
psychological closure motivated by less ennobled (although no less real) emotions of anger
and vengeance. Claims to heal the collective unconscious of the nation therefore mask how
truth commissions both lift an authoritarian regime of denial and public silence, as well as
create a new regime of forgetting which represses other memories and forms of
psychological closure.
JUXTAPOSING NATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL TRAUMA
Nations do not have collective psyches which can be healed, nor do whole nations suffer
post-traumatic stress disorder and to assert otherwise is to psychologize an abstract entity
which exists primarily in the minds of nation-building politicians. Nevertheless, it is
remarkable how widely accepted this nationalist language is in the literature on truth
commissions and post-Communist truth-telling. It is almost as if because nationalist
discourse is contained within human rights talk, then it cannot be in any way misguided or
destructive. However, the mythology of nation-building can have damaging consequences

for individual survivors who are seen as 'out of step' with a putative collective conscience.
Michael Ignatieff challenges the notion of national psyches when he writes:
We tend to vest our nations with conscience, identities and memories as if they were
individuals. It is problematic enough to vest an individual with a single identity: our inner
lives are like battlegrounds over which uneasy truces reign; the identity of a nation is
additionally fissured by region, ethnicity, class and education [Ignatieff, 1998, p. 169].
Instead of reconstructing the national psyche and healing the nation, Ignatieff argues that
truth commissions can only provide a frame for public discourse and public memory. They
can help to create a new public space in which debate and discussion on the past occurs.
Beyond this they can do little, although they can be useful if they present the past as an
irresolvable argument that is to be continually debated. This is not wholly open-ended, as
they must also define the acceptable limits of the argument over what happened to whom and
reduce the range of permissible historical revisionism. Within the context of public
discourse, the past is subject to infinite debate where memory is not a fixed object, but the
social practice that constitutes narratives on the past.
At the level of the subject, victims’ expectations and desires can converge with the efforts of
national truth commissions, which can legitimate the multiplicity of voices that make up the
national debate on the past. The legitimating function of this new framing of history is
important because during the authoritarian era such narratives are regularly silenced and
deformed by the media, the courts and public institutions. Truth commissions and other
processes to establish new truths (for example, commissions of enquiry) can create public
spaces in which survivors can articulate their individual narratives. Their voices are heard
often for the first time by a national audience, many of whom previously claimed they did
not know about the violent past. After the extensive media coverage of a truth commission,
the argument that atrocities did not occur can never again be made – the range of licit truths
(and lies) is, in this way, irrevocably narrowed.
Yet if we look hard, we start to see cracks appearing between the national and individual
representation of trauma, if only because there is a "truth that can be known only by those
on the inside" (Ignatieff, 1998, p. 175) and that the truth itself is highly personalised.
Michael Lapsley (1997, p. 46), priest and facilitator of the Healing the Memory Workshops, in
South Africa, argues that "memory can be healed" by individuals. To this end individuals
need to talk about their distinctive pasts, put their memories on the table, open them up,
clean them out and in so doing facilitate healing. Apart from his rather outdated ‘suitcase’
metaphor of memory, Lapsley does capture the uniqueness of individual acts of
remembering, and the need for a diversity of memory processes outside of national
commissions.

The Healing the Memory Workshops are independent of the South African TRC and provide a
structured forum in which individuals can constitute a new identity by gazing upon the past
in a highly personalised way. The South African TRC in itself did provide some of these
functions through its hearings process, and was a psychologically healing process insofar as
it provided a space for memory work to occur. It was also useful in that it created the
context and new legitimate space for endeavours such as Lapsley’s workshops.
Nevertheless, recent history from Latin America teaches us that the establishment of a truth
commission in itself is not enough to meet the psychological needs of individuals – they
may be necessary first steps toward individual psychological healing but they are generally
not sufficient in themselves (see Hamber, 1995).
Survivors and the victims for whom they grieve both inhabit a liminal space, which is both
part of society but removed from society; it could be called an experience of ‘the living
dead’. This space is characterised by uncertainty and doubt, and is caused, according to
Freud, by survivors’ experiences of the uncanny. Survivors’ needs for closure and symbolic
reintegration, (that is, an end to a state of uncertainty and liminal status) may work in
different ways to those enshrined within national commissions. Truth commissions can
assert an over-simplistic view of what it takes to move on from the past. Importantly, it
should not be assumed too easily, as the banners displayed by the TRC did, that "Revealing
is Healing" (Hamber, 1998, p. 83). Hayes writes, "Just revealing, is not just healing. It
depends on how we reveal, the context of the revealing, and what it is that we are revealing"
(Hayes, 1998, p. 43). Thus, remembering, in itself, is not necessarily a directly redemptive
and liberating practice, and is only one of many possible routes to symbolic closure for
survivors. By 'closure' we mean a situation where the trauma is no longer seen as unfinished
business, requiring, for instance a compulsion to take revenge. Grief and loss no longer
plague the individual consciously or unconsciously, and the victim lives not in a state
somewhere between denial and obsession, where the loss is to a large degree accepted and
incorporated into the functioning of everyday life.
Furthermore commissions, since they are often transitory and last at best only a few years,
may seek forms of closure which are only partial. Truth commissions often operate on a
time frame which is highly curtailed and limited, and which requires a premature process of
dealing with the past from survivors of atrocities for whom the process of grieving often lasts
a lifetime. ‘Truth’ in the sense of speaking about the past and having one's version
recognised, is but one of the many possible forms of closure for the individual. Processes
aimed at closure are also inherently contradictory in their nature. Reparations provided
through truth commission processes or after formal enquiries, for example, can aid closure
but can also be viewed as problematical by some victims who may be uncomfortable with
accepting what they perceive as ‘blood money’. Arguably, revenge could also serve the
function of closure for the individual; a possibility wholly excluded and deemed outside the
acceptable range of discourse of the South African TRC. Equally, revenge could also serve

as a way of perpetuating violence and in so doing trap the individual in the liminal space.
The rest of this chapter addresses how truth commissions seek symbolic closure and how the
limited procedures adopted converge or diverge with survivors' individual agendas. We will
argue that truth commissions (and other projects to rewrite the official version of the past)
and individuals proceed along different temporal continuums when dealing with violence
and trauma. This chapter shows how different processes embodied in individual trauma
work, national history-making, and reparations offered by truth commissions. These interact
and shape one another, and at times are mutually reinforcing while at other times they are
disharmonious and incongruous.
THE MEANING OF REPARATIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT (2)
Another arena of societal struggles over memory centres on the physical markers of past
violence and repression. Monuments and museums, plaques and other markers are some of
the ways in which governments as well as social actors try to embody memories. Other
social forces, meanwhile, try to erase and transform these physical markers, as if by
changing the shape and function of a place one can banish it from memory [Jelin, 1998, p.
26].
Reparations are one of the main means by which truth commissions and similar processes
seek to achieve national and individual reconciliation, and they result in common
psychological consequences in each case. Psychologically speaking, the so-called symbolic
acts of reparation(3) such as reburials, and material acts of reparation such as payments,
serve the same end. Both these forms of reparation can, although not necessarily, play an
important role in processes of opening space for bereavement, addressing trauma and
ritualising symbolic closure. They acknowledge and recognise the individual’s suffering and
place it within a new officially sanctioned history of trauma. Symbolic representations of the
trauma, particularly if the symbols are personalised, can concretise a traumatic event, and
help re-attribute responsibility. The latter stage is important because labelling responsibility
can appropriately redirect blame towards perpetrators and relieve the moral ambiguity and
guilt survivors often feel.
Reparations, symbolic or otherwise, can serve as focal points in the grieving process, and
this can aid recovery by allowing individuals to focus exclusively on their grief. Survivors
often unconsciously turn to institutions such as truth commissions, the criminal justice
system or community/traditional justice processes as a context in which they externalise
their grief and seek to come to terms with it. The symbols of public or collective ritual, and
material reparations in some instances, can mark the point of moving onto a new phase and
represent an individual’s mastery over the past. On a macro level extensive social processes
like truth commissions can represent a new willingness by the state or civil society
institutions to exhume the buried issues of the past through. This can occur metaphorically

or literally, as when truth commissions recover the hidden physical remains of the
disappeared.
Unfortunately, no matter how well meaning, all reparations strategies and governmental
commissions face the same, albeit obvious, intractable problem. Acknowledgement,
apology, recognition, material assistance, a perpetrator's confession and even exhuming the
bodies/bones of the ‘missing’ can never bring back the dead or be guaranteed to converge
with, and ameliorate, all the levels of psychological pain suffered by a survivor. Memory
work revisits the past as an alienated tourist, and its attempts at recovery are constantly
undermined by both the fractured nature of lived memory and the irrecoverability of time.
The trauma and accompanying senses of injustice, anger and hurt, which lie in the depths of
the actor’s psyche, are both immeasurable and ineffable. Furthermore, recovery from
trauma is obstructed by the unlikelihood of justice in many societies in transition. This is
typified by the South African TRC’s amnesty process that grants indemnity from civil and
criminal proceedings to perpetrators who confess to political crimes; and more dramatically
where blanket amnesties have been granted to perpetrators as occurred in Chile, Argentina,
Brazil, Guatemala and a number of African countries.
Thus reparation (and all action undertaken by a truth commission) has ambivalent
psychological consequences for survivors – public acknowledgement of social truths and
monetary compensation are valuable contributions, but they can never wholly meet all the
psychological needs of the survivors as these are disparate, inchoate and contradictory. The
result is that in the aftermath of large-scale political violence, we should expect to have to
live with the unsatisfied demands (for their own versions of truth, justice, compensation,
and so on) of survivors for a long time. Truth commissions, with their focus on speaking
about and writing a revised account of the past, are at best only the beginning of a set of
linked processes which may lead to symbolic closure for some individuals.
LIMINALITY AND REINTEGRATION
To better understand the impact of nation-state attempts at reconciliation through
reparations, truth commission reports and the like, we have to return and look more closely
at survivors’ experiences of trauma caused by political violence. Trauma and violence
shatter individual cognitive assumptions about the self and the world. Severe forms of
trauma shatter the cognitive assumptions of personal invulnerability, viewing oneself
positively and that the world is a meaningful and comprehensible place (Janoff-Bulman,
1985).
Trauma often results in confusion, and an inability to fully understand the causes of one's
suffering. This ‘bafflement’ grows out of a negative encounter with the authoritarian state
which deforms rationality and foments personal and social chaos and an attendant
fragmenting of the self (Neal, 1998, p. 6). As a result of trauma and a state-sponsored regime

of denial, basic questions are raised and remain unanswered, such as, how and why did the
event happen and what is going to happen next (ibid., p. 201)? The confusion and
bafflement following a trauma, and the shattering of cognitive assumptions about the world,
are exacerbated when the markers of the past that give it its coherence, such as the existence
and compassion of loved ones, are destroyed or rendered invisible. This is particularly the
case with regard to political disappearance that thrusts an inordinate amount of unanswered
(and technically unanswerable) questions upon the survivor. The personal perplexity and
incoherence of the trauma is extreme in the case of political disappearances.
Suarez-Orozco (1991) has written about such issues with respect to Argentina, and he
documents how disappearances and the lack of bodies to be buried creates an ontological
uncertainty among survivors and a psychological experience of what Freud termed the
uncanny. This notion captures the common difficulties experienced by survivors who must
mourn without a corpse: "The uncanny feeds on uncertainty (Is he/she alive? Is he/she
dead?)" (ibid., p. 491). As a result, in Argentina, mummification took on epidemic
proportions following disappearances, where the bedrooms and offices of the disappeared
were kept as they were at the time of the disappearance, while the living waited for their
return (ibid., p. 490). Similarly, in Brazil some families even refuse to move house in case
their missing relatives finally come home.(4) In Northern Ireland, some of the families of
the disappeared(5) have not cleaned out the rooms of their missing relatives - despite the fact
that the last political disappearance happened in the early 1980s.(6)
Both the survivor and the dead inhabit a symbolically liminal social space. Both are part of
society but removed from society. This is captured in the words of a relative of the
disappeared in Northern Ireland, when he says, "We have been left hanging in space. There
are people who know exactly where the disappeared are. Why doesn’t somebody tell us
where they are?"(7) In South Africa, survivors and the families of victims reiterate the same
haunting cry, "If they can just show us the bones of my child, where did they leave the
bones of my child?"(8) The full horror of the liminal space is most poignantly captured by
Mathilde Mellibovsky in a book entitled A Circle of Love Around Death, about the mothers of
the disappeared in Argentina. She writes:
I do not imagine hell as beds with shackles where the condemned must lie, but rather as a
couple of easy chairs in which one can sit comfortably and wait for the postman to bring
news – which will never come [in Bronkhorst, 1995].
Experiences of the uncanny can be exacerbated by the responses of government officials.
Relatives of those arrested or disappeared, particularly in Latin America, Eastern Europe
and South Africa, would search in local jails, police stations, and morgues, but would often
receive little information. In many cases, relatives looking for the disappeared were given a
run around by authorities from one police station to another. Authorities would deny any
knowledge of their fate, and leave writs of habeas corpus unanswered. As Malin (1994:197)

writes of the uncertainty generated in the Latin American context:
In denying knowledge or responsibility for the disappearances, the state created a system in
which their victims seemed to have never existed at all. Habeus corpus does not work for the
simple reason that there is 'no corpus'. No cuerpo. No body.
In South Africa, the police often told families that their children had left the country to join
the liberation movement armed forces in exile. This was, in some cases, true – but in others
was a cover up for a security force disappearance and murder. This left many families in an
uncanny space in which they believed (or at least hoped) that their loved ones were in exile
and would return once liberation was achieved. Joyce Mtimkulu, who lived in hope for
eight years that her son was in exile, captures the uncertain feelings around this. She says:
The release of Mandela to me was the loss of my son because he should have come back
with others…that hope that everybody is coming back home, the other people got happy
about that, but to us it was the moment of tears because our son never came back [see
Endnote 8].
In many cases in Latin America, the security forces, in a Kafkaesque twist, would seize and
destroy all identification papers of their victim and then deny that they had ever existed.
Security police and the military intentionally promoted the unreality of death by making the
victim’s body vanish and then wiping away any official record of the victim’s existence.(9)
This eradication of the identity of the victim would leave survivors in a state of profound
ontological insecurity.
Political disappearances around the world appear to have different gender effects. Most
commonly, it is the female relatives of victims who are most vocal about being forced into a
liminal space along with their relatives. Ramphele (1996) has analysed in detail how in
South Africa widowhood places women into a liminal phase and a state of ambiguity that is
symbolically marked. Political widows became the embodiment of social memory about the
fallen hero and social ambiguity is inscribed onto their bodies during this state. In Sotho and
Tswana communities, the body of the widow is marked in ways which express a fear of
ritual dangers: her head is shaved, her body is smeared with charcoal and herbs, her face is
covered with a black veil (Pauw, 1990). Occasionally a widow wears her clothes inside out,
or only one shoe. She does not eat off of everyday utensils and must stay out of the public
arena. Silence becomes a marker of liminal status.
Unfortunately, however, the reality is that the material symbol (usually the body) that is
necessary for moving out of the liminal space is seldom recovered after large-scale political
violence. In these cases in South Africa, the truth commission became the next best (or the
least worst) option, as it attempted to at least corroborate some information about what

happened to disappeared individuals.
PUBLIC TESTIMONY AND SYMBOLIC CLOSURE
How does testifying at hearings relate to feelings of the uncanny and liminality? Speaking at
public hearings like those of the South African TRC can break an enforced silence and
represent a point of closure and transition in the grieving process, through interacting with
the national symbolic process of the TRC. The widow, in Ramphele’s sense, leaves behind
her grieving phase, shedding the symbols of her liminality. In its reparations policy (which
may include personal monetary reparation and symbolic forms like tombstones or
monuments), the TRC creates possibilities for the internalisation of loss and Freud’s work of
mourning (trauerarbeit) that does not exist through legal channels.(10) Without a corpse or a
conviction it was often not possible to get compensation legally, but through the TRC it was
much easier to obtain a finding (recognition of loss or suffering) and to obtain reparations
(symbolic compensation for the loss).
One case which demonstrates a survivor’s experience of uncertainty and her quest to resolve
liminality through legal and TRC channels is that of Susan van der Merwe of
Potchefstroom, a teacher and mother of five. Susan van der Merwe was married to a white
farmer who went missing at Buffelsdrift, at the border post between South Africa and
Botswana on 1 November 1978. Susan van der Merwe reported at the TRC hearings in
Klerksdorp in September 1996 the same kinds of deep uncertainty as documented by
Suarez-Orozco for victims in Argentina, "my whole life was then an uncertainty…and this
uncertainty hung over us like a dark cloud. It left such an immense, indescribable feeling of
a vacuum that you cannot explain it to anyone else. One’s life, your whole life is
incomplete".(11) The uncertainty surrounding her husband’s disappearance was worse than
knowing that he was dead and placed the family in a liminal state. The two children at
university were ‘deeply disturbed’ and failed their term exams. This state of liminality was
material and financial, as well as psychological. Since Susan van der Merwe had no official
evidence of her husband’s death, she could not conduct financial transactions and she was
not able to secure loans to buy a house or pay for her children’s’ university costs. She said:
At the beginning of 1979, the two children wanted to go and reregister at the university but
the bank manager informed me that I did not have any security. The circumstances were
that I was completely dependent on my husband. He ran on the financial matters…It never
occurred to me that because of the way in which my husband had died, that if there were
any funds available from him, that it would have been taken away from me because we
were not married in community of property [see Endnote 11].
Prior to the TRC the case was investigated by the security police and four years later, in
1982, the Supreme Court established the events around the farmer’s disappearance.
Through the evidence of a police informer ‘Mr. X’, the court heard how four umkhonto we

sizwe (MK)(12) combatants had been walking along the road to Thabazimbi, when van der
Merwe stopped and offered them a lift to the next town. Once in the car, the MK cadres
pulled out guns and forced the farmer to drive in the opposite direction and they used his car
to transport goods. They then walked Mr. Van der Merwe out into the bush and executed
him, and drove his car to the border. One MK cadre led police to the scene, but the body
was never found.
For the family of the farmer, the court case resolved only some of their questions. "After
these findings, the Supreme Court certified my husband as dead, and this left my children in
another vacuum of uncertainty. Why was such a horrendous deed done to my husband
which cost him his life? For what purpose, what were they hoping to achieve by that (see
Endnote 11)?" Susan van der Merwe never got the answers to those questions from her
husbands' killers, yet, despite opposition from her conservative white community on the
West Rand, she explicitly stated that speaking in public in itself was important to her. She
needed to present her story and wrestle with its inconsistencies publicly and also to affirm
her renunciation of a past of racialised violence.
In the case of Susan van der Merwe, and many others like it, we see how the pursuit of truth
through the courts and TRC became a way of addressing loss publicly. According to SuarezOrozco (1991), by pursuing their crusade for justice, the Madres of the Plaza de Mayo(13)
similarly internalised their loss. Thus national institutional processes (such as truth
commissions and the justice system) are, at least in certain ways, closely bound up with
individual psychological processes. The TRC in South Africa, at least to some degree,
became a mode of psychological repair, where denial could be superseded and both work of
mourning (transition out of uncertainty and liminality) and narrative fetishism (teleologising
and attaching transcendental meaning to loss) could take place. Both are ways in which
individuals reconstruct their social identities through forging a meaningful and coherent
narrative in the wake of trauma. The TRC thus became a mechanism through which
ideological rationalisations for loss could be internalised. Suffering became meaningful by
associating it with the teleology of the liberation struggle and the universal redemption of
reconciliation.
In some instances even more minimal forms of recognition by the TRC can be useful and
move the individual toward closure. Sandra Peake, co-ordinator of the WAVE Counselling
Centre in Belfast, says it is only over the last year, as the peace process has moved forward,
that some of the families of the disappeared in Northern Ireland have started to clean out
the rooms of their missing relatives and get rid of their clothes. She feels that this subtle
change has come about because of the moves toward peace and the recognition in 1995, and
onwards, that there are in fact disappeared persons in Northern Ireland (see Endnote 6).
However, based on our comparative analysis of several countries, it is evident that for most
people more is needed than simple recognition and acknowledgement. The body itself, and

the process of grieving around it, is of significance in most cultures. In Northern Ireland it is
common for the families of the disappeared to stress the importance of a ‘proper and decent
Christian burial’.(14) The rituals that take place around the bodily remains aid closure and,
without the body, closure seems all the more improbable. In this regard, Sandra Peake
points out the importance of the Irish wake and the ritual significance of sitting up all night
with the corpse (see Endnote 6). If this is not possible because the body is truly gone, she
says, the only other strategy that can bring some closure for the relatives is the revealing of
the facts about the disappearance and why the person was taken in the first place. This
stresses again that a truth recovery process (for example, the South Africa TRC, a formal
inquiry, and so on) remains the only, albeit limited, hope for having some questions
answered.(15)
REPARATIONS AND THE LIMINALITY OF THE DEAD
In the absence of the body and without information, as is the case in so many post-conflict
societies, can symbolic processes of closure take place? The projection of liminality of the
subject onto a reified image of the deceased in South Africa provides unexpected answers to
this question. In South African townships, research has commonly found that survivors
projected their own liminality onto an image of those killed violently or disappeared.(16)
The case of Two-Bob Mpofu, although not a political case, demonstrates the link between
violent endings and the liminal dead in South Africa. In this case, which received national
press coverage, the people of Msogwaba near Nelspruit in South Africa were, according to
reports, being haunted by a man who was stabbed to death by his girlfriend in 1993. The
ghost of the deceased, Two-Bob Mpofu, was seen walking around the streets and assaulting
passers-by. One man, Thami Mlaba, reported that he was kidnapped by the ghost, assaulted
and dumped in the graveyard. The dead man’s relatives were particularly prey to his
vengeance. The ghost attacked his sister, Nomajele Mpofu, in her home and chased her out
of the house. Even a local policeman, Vusi Magagula of the Criminal Investigations
Department, claimed to have been assaulted, "I fired several shots at the ghost and emptied
my gun, but nothing happened. So I ran away".(17)
A similar phenomenon is also observed in cases of political murder, such as the Sebokeng
Night Vigil massacre of 1991, which resulted from a fratricidal war between militarised
youth of the rival African National Congress (ANC) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).
Margaret Nangalembe is the mother of the murdered ANC comrade Christopher
Nangalembe who was allegedly killed by his IFP adversary (and former childhood friend)
Victor Kheswa. Nangalembe's night vigil was attacked, allegedly by members of Kheswa's
heavily armed gang, who threw hand grenades and fired into the crowd with AK-47s. 42
mourners attending the vigil were killed.(18) At the end of an author interview with
Margaret Nangalembe, she broke down and implored, "Why don’t people come around to
my house like before? They avoid it. They say that the dead are walking around in this

house, and in the garden."(19)
For Margaret Nangalembe, going to the TRC, testifying in public and receiving reparations
was an inchoate attempt to symbolically lay the ghosts of the Sebokeng Night Vigil
Massacre to rest. Experiences of liminality demand symbolic recognition, at some level,
through public testimony, a memorial or reparations. All reparations (including monetary
compensation) are like tombstones – a way of materialising the dead, a way of shifting from
the "liminal unknown to the liminal known" (Ramphele, 1996, p. 111). Reparations are
therefore a material representation and fixation of memory work, a recognition of the
experience of liminality and its objectification in the external world.
Material reparations and compensation serve the same psychological ends as symbolic acts.
They are both attempts to ritually create symbolic closure. Financial reparations are often
mistakenly viewed as, and spoken about by policy-makers and victims alike, as form of
concrete assistance that is different (and certainly more substantial) than symbolic acts such
as the erection of tombstones or the naming of streets after the dead. However, the reality is
that seldom will the sums of money granted ever equal the actual amount of money lost
over the years when a breadwinner is killed, and it is questionable whether the low levels of
material reparations offered will dramatically change the life of the recipients. In the South
Africa case, material reparation is merely another form of symbolic reparation, albeit
particularly welcomed by the destitute survivors for whom any amount of money is
appreciated.
When the living receive payment for offences against the dead (and forsake revenge), this
can, in some cases, solidify and resolve the dead, who were previously seen as wandering
like undead ghosts. Reparations (and processes of remembering and commemoration)
stabilise the ghosts, they domesticate and tame them by representing the compensation for
their death.
Reparations seem to be one key strategy survivors pursue in order to address their
overwhelming feelings of uncertainty. In his essay The Gift, Marcel Mauss asserts that
prestations are "total social movements" that are at the same time economic, juridical, moral
and psychological phenomena, where "the law of things remains bound up with the law of
persons" (Mauss, 1988, p. 2). Material things transferred between people are not inert but
contain a spirit of obligation and a part of the giver, that is, "to give something is to give a
part of oneself" (ibid., p. 10). The objects exchanged are never completely separate from the
people that exchange them and the social context of the exchange, and thus the act of
exchange is replete with rights and duties.
Thus, objects are embedded in a social grammar of loss, liminality, closure and
responsibility. To this end genuine reparation, and the process of healing, we assert, does
not occur through the delivery of the object (for example, a pension, a monument and so

on) but through the process that takes place around the object.
Mauss is drawing our attention to something very important in the transfer of material
objects between people, and that is how persons and things become symbolically equalized
and inter-exchangeable. There seems to be an unconscious principle of the transmutability
of people and things being played out when the state gives reparations to families of the
dead and disappeared. Mauss’ discussion of the hau, or the "spirit of the gift" is relevant
here, where the hau of reparations is compensation for the spirit of the deceased. The spirit
of the dead person and the spirit of the material reparations become exchanged in the
transaction between the state and the survivor. The state’s obligation to pay reparations
results from the duty to repay victims for their sacrifice (in terms of suffering and loss) to the
liberation and the construction of the new political order. Victims gave the gifts of their own
spirits to ‘the community’ and the obligation of the new state is to return the gift in the form
of reparations to their families.
THE DARKER SIDE OF CLOSURE
The unconscious associations around reparations are not without their darker connotations,
as Mauss has recognised, "The gift is something that must be recognised and that is, at the
same time, dangerous to accept" (ibid., p. 58). Reparations place survivors in double-bind
situations. Reparations can constitute closure and the final acceptance of loss, but they also
can create difficulties for survivors. Some of the Madres of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina are
opposed to monetary reparations, since to accept reparation is to acknowledge death(20).
This stands in sharp contrast to the constant rallying cry of the Madres in Argentina, which is
"those who were taken from us alive should be returned to us alive." Accepting reparations
implies giving up hope that the disappeared would return alive. Similarly, in Brazil, a
process of naming streets after the missing (and killed) under the Brazilian dictatorship
(1964-1985) has been greeted with ambivalent responses. Some families have been against it
because they believe that naming the street concretises the death of their missing relatives.
These families appear to still live in hope (or denial) that their children will return and have
therefore refused to attend the inauguration of the streets named after their loved ones (see
Endnote 4). This refusal also links to feelings of betrayal. Suarez-Orozco argues this is the
case for the Madres in Argentina, when he writes:
The Mothers argue that any such bureaucratic intervention requires them to psychologically
become their children’s executioners: they would first need to psychologically kill and bury
their children before proceeding with the legal route. And this is too costly, much too guilt
inducing. It is as if giving up hope is betraying their children [Suarez-Orozco, 1991, p. 496].
Perhaps part of their refusal may also involve wanting others to experience the frustration
they have felt. They are determined to offer constant reminders that, in reality, there is
nothing that can ever be done to replace their missing loved ones. Yet part of the refusal also

relates to the way in which governments often seek closure on the past more readily than
individuals. For survivors, the state’s desire to build a new post-conflict society often means
sloughing off the past too easily, and asking survivors to engage in a premature closure
before all the psychological processes around truth and recompense are fully internalised.
The Madres did not accept the sacrifice of their children or husbands for the new civilian
order. They refused to be embodied symbols of the contrast between the old repressive
regime and the new benevolent political order. This is read as a vehement rejection of the
post-authoritarian regime. This is one reason why government officials and the Argentinean
press came to vilify the Madres, who, over the years, have changed from being the ‘Mothers
of the Nation’ to Las Locas or the ‘Crazy Little Old Ladies’ of the Plaza de Mayo. The
recalcitrant Madres were demonized as they no longer embodied the state's vision of a
reconciled nation. They persisted in remaining ambiguous when politicians such as former
Argentinian President Carlos Menem demanded unity, certainty and closure to bolster a
post-authoritarian nation-building project.
Similarly, despite decades having passed since the dictatorship in Brazil, the continuous
demands of the Comissão de Familiares de Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos (Commission for the
Family Members of the Persons Killed or Disappeared for Political Reasons) for the truth
before compensation, and their refusal to see the new law(21) as the final stop, has made
them unpopular. The government and even some previously sympathetic members of
society now refer to the group as ‘dinosaurs’ (Hamber, 1997). They, and the Madres, are
seen as imprisoned in the past, as hostages to their own memory and therefore obstructions
to the process of selective forgetting advocated by reconciling national political leaders.
The rise and fall of social movements such as the Madres indicates that drawing closure
around past violations is an inherently contradictory process that can be expected to take
decades. This is the lesson of the French obsession with the war crimes trial of Maurice
Papon in 1997, or the rejoicing of many Chileans after the arrest of General Pinochet in a
London clinic in late October 1998. Clearly, how to address a history of mass violations is
not an issue that will simply be resolved by a two-year truth commission, or when
reparations are granted. Reparations and symbolic acts are useful markers in the first stages
of recognising and dealing with formerly silenced memory. However, although reparations
may well be necessary (and a good starting point) on an individual level, they will never be
sufficient. Resolution depends on how individuals personally engage in 'trauma work' at
their own idiosyncratic pace.
On a psychological level, for a survivor to react in an overly forgiving way toward
perpetrators, or to simply 'let bygones be bygones' in the words of former South African
State President FW de Klerk, is highly improbable in the short-term, and even over decades
in some cases (Hamber, 1998, p. 68). The South African TRC has been a catalyst for
successful resolution of the past for some individuals.(22) However, by the time reparations

are granted (still outstanding at the time of writing), most survivors will not have completed
their trauma work and be willing to adhere to nationally defined prerogatives of
remembering and forgetting. It is critical that victims are not expected, either implicitly or
explicitly, to forgive the perpetrators, or forget about the past because some form of
reparation (or a comprehensive report on the nature and extent of past violations) has been
made.
When reparations are granted before the survivor is psychologically ready, any form of
reparation can be expected to leave the survivor feeling dissatisfied. When survivors or
families of victims disparagingly talk of reparations as a form of blood money (as some do
in Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Northern Ireland), this is because the national process of
'reconciliation' does not coincide with the individual psychological process. Reparations and
the truth about what happened must be linked, because without this link any form of
reparation runs the danger of being seen by the survivors as a governmental strategy to close
the chapter on the past prematurely and leave the secrets of the past hidden. Reparations
without truth make survivors feel that reparations are being used to buy their silence and put
a stop to their continuing a quest for truth and justice.
The long-term and individualised nature of coming to terms with the past is captured by the
words of Joyce Mtimkulu, whose son went missing in Port Elizabeth, South Africa in the
1990s. Through the TRC a version of the truth has been revealed. The perpetrators have
confessed that her son was tortured, shot, his body burnt and his remains thrown into the
Fish River. Despite the emergence of a fairly coherent version of the truth, inconsistencies
still exist in the stories of the security police killers, and Mtimkulu remains dissatisfied with
what has taken place. After testifying at the hearing and hearing the killers confess, she says:
I have not forgiven them, why must I forgive them when they don’t want to tell the truth,
and the beauty of this is that they are not asking for forgiveness from us, the people who
have lost their beloved ones. They are asking forgiveness from the government, they did
nothing to the government, what they did, they did to us [see Endnote 8].
Ignatieff concludes in this case, "Joyce speaks with words of anger, words of grief, truth is
not enough, the time for forgiveness has not yet come, the time for reconciliation is in the
future" (ibid.).
REVENGE AND PUNISHMENT AS FORMS OF CLOSURE
We are concerned that the commissioners [of the South African TRC] are critical of efforts to
bring to book those who perpetrated crimes against humanity. They think justice is of less
value than their reconciliation showbiz and avalanche of tears.(23)
To effectively deal with the impact of large-scale political violence, we need to fully

comprehend its variegated impact on individuals. National politicians cannot expect
individuals to accept their agenda and time schedule for dealing with the past. In particular,
they cannot be expected to abandon demands for justice as a form of redress necessary for
ending liminality in some cases. This was demonstrated during the Azanian People’s
Organisation (AZAPO) and the survivors’ families of high profile murder cases (Biko,
Mxenge and Ribeiro) constitutional challenge in 1996. They challenged section 20(7) of the
National Unity and Reconciliation Act, which permitted the TRC to grant amnesty
according to certain criteria laid down in the Act. They contested the amnesty provision
because, if amnesty is granted, the survivors are denied a right to criminal or civil action
against the perpetrator.(24) This constitutional challenge was dismissed by the
Constitutional Court in 1996(25), which finally laid aside victims’ demands for legal
retribution and prosecution for those who were granted amnesty in South Africa.
Although the forgoing of formal justice in South Africa may have been necessary to ensure
peace, this national process can run counter to the individual psychological healing process
and asks another sacrifice from the victims. This is captured in the words of Archbishop
Tutu when he says:
If the security forces had thought that they were going to be up for the high jump we would
not have had a negotiated settlement, that is the price that had to be paid, and yes, the
victims and survivors are probably asked a second time and to be willing – if this high price
had not been paid this country would have gone up in flames.(26)
Indeed the price for the survivors has been high – but how do survivors, given the loss that
they have suffered, process this? At the time of significant loss most people enter into a
number of invisible pacts with themselves. Sometimes this can be a vow to avenge the death
of a loved one, either through formal punishment or personal vengeance. This vow is made,
not due to sadistic pleasure, but rather as a way of respecting the person who has died, to
make their death and memory meaningful. Individuals also often vow that nothing will ever
replace what has been lost.
Revenge, or the infliction of harm in response to perceived harm or injustice (see Stuckless
and Goranson, 1994, pp. 803-811), is, according to Michael Ignatieff, commonly regarded
as a low and unworthy emotion because its deep moral hold on people is rarely understood
(Ignatieff, 1998, p. 188). Ignatieff recognises that revenge is a profound moral desire to keep
faith with the dead, to honour their memory by taking up their cause where they left off. To
this end, revenge keeps faith between generations and the violence that follows is a ritual
form of respect for the community’s dead. For Ignatieff, therein lies the legitimacy of
revenge.
Nietzsche is one of the few philosophers to have asserted the centrality of revenge in the
pursuit of justice, "The spirit of revenge: my friends, that up to now, has been mankind’s

chief concern: and where there was suffering, there was always supposed to be punishment"
(Nietzsche, 1969, p. 162). Practically the whole of the rest of western philosophy and
jurisprudence has followed Kant and Hegel in denouncing revenge and distinguishing
rational law and justice from revenge. The South African TRC has, in the interests of
national reconciliation, muted feelings of vengeance and replaced them with what it calls a
more restorative model.(27) As a result of national imperatives, survivors have generally felt
inhibited in expressing their legitimate rage and anger, and demanding just retribution.
Erich Fromm feels that vengeance (revenge) is in some senses a magic act and, like
punishment for a crime, it can serve the function of magically expunging the perpetrators'
act (Fromm, 1984, p. 364). Fromm links vengeance directly to reparation; vengeance is said
to be a magical reparation. In this way, like reparations, we contend that revenge and
punishment (and perhaps the fantasies thereof) can also be a way to lay the ghosts of the
violently killed to rest and end the liminal status of the victim and survivor.
Furthermore, if the desire for vengeance grips the survivor, then accepting paltry reparations
can also be experienced by the survivor as a disrespectful act that betrays the loss they have
endured or the memory of those killed. In essence, rituals of respect (such as retribution
through the courts) and remembering can be broken by reparations, just as they can in some
cases serve as a symbol of mending.
The difficulties of coming to terms with the aftermath of political trauma for the individual
have to be acknowledged. Coming to terms with the past can only be eased by recognising
as legitimate the multiple and contradictory agendas which exist among a heterogeneous
community of survivors. The demands of some survivors for retributive justice need to be
seen as just as legitimate a path to 'reconciliation' as forgiveness. Public and private space
needs to be made to enable them to rework their diverse memories of past conflicts and
feelings of anger. Contained, yet legitimate, revenge and punishment feelings are obviously
more desirable than acted-out fantasies.
A state-led process of substantial and personalised symbolic, material and collective
reparations also needs to be set in motion. This did not occur in the South African context,
where reparations were very low on the list of priorities of national politicians, and a
compensation scheme for the majority of victims had not been established at the time of
writing, over a year after the TRC's report was published. In January 2000, the Mbeki
government stated its intention to offer only token compensation of a few hundred pounds
(Rands 2000), instead of the £15000 which the TRC recommended should be given to 22000
victims of apartheid. Duma Khumalo spoke for many victims when he protested bitterly,
‘We have been betrayed. The previous government gave the killers golden handshakes and
the present government gave them amnesty. [But] the victims have been left empty handed
[‘Apartheid Victims Reject Handouts’ Guardian. 3 January, 2000].’

CONCLUSION: WHERE DWELL THE VAST HOSTS OF THE DEAD?
His soul had approached the region where dwell the vast hosts of the dead. He was
conscious of, but could not apprehend, their wayward and flickering existence. His own
identity was fading into a grey impalpable world: the solid world itself which these dead had
one time reared and lived in was dissolving and dwindling (James Joyce in his short story
entitled The Dead).
The process of breaking a regime of denial, addressing and recognising repressed memories,
compensating for loss, and ultimately arriving at some type of closure and reintegration of
liminal subjects, works at different levels, i.e. individuals, truth commissions, and criminal
prosecutions. There are different motivations at these different levels, and they proceed at
different paces. There is not a single process of dealing with the past that restores the
'national psyche' to good health. We have rejected the idea of the collective as an
extrapolation of the individual as a myth of nation-building. Instead, we have drawn
attention to the disjunctures, as well as the convergences, between individual responses and
national institutions. National processes such as truth commissions (although by no means
the only process) can provide a useful framework in which new rituals or spaces can be
provided for the enactment of closure.
Strategies such as truth commissions, Fiona Ross argues, are performances of memory that
create a framework of explanation (Ross, 1997, p. 9). Ross (ibid., p. 10) quotes Jack
Kugelmas' formulation that memory is a process of both remembering and forgetting. Facts
need a narrative framework in order to be rendered meaningful and take their place in a
shared account of the past. Where there is no accessible literature of destruction,
performance (rituals) are means to bridge what he calls the "fundamental discontinuities of
life". To this end, Ross argues that through the South African TRC:
South Africa is currently witnessing a process of shifting a new framework of description
and definition into place, creating, if not a cohesive narrative of past pain, then at least the
beginnings of a framework within which moralities can be placed and debated...The
framework is contested. Indeed, that is the strength of the commission’s process...It gives
visible and tangible shape to the past, providing, shall we say, a ritual context within which
the past can be examined and placed on record – at least in part [ibid.].
Governmental strategies like truth commissions can create the public space for survivors to
begin the process of working through a violent and conflicted history. Of course they are
also not the only means. For any strategy for dealing with the past to be successful, an
ongoing space has to be provided for survivors to express both their grief and their rage, as
they struggle to come to terms with the inherent ambivalences of the psychological and
emotional impact of their loss – a loss that reparation and even the truth can only partially
acknowledge. It is how the individual processes the symbolic meaning of the ritual, the

reparation or a national process such as a truth commission, that is critical. For this reason,
making space for the legitimate complaints and opposition of survivors should be seen as an
integral component of dealing with the past. These spaces can take the form of private
spaces (for example, counselling, culturally appropriate mechanisms for story-telling and
sharing, and so on) and the ongoing use of public space (for example, media, exhibitions,
theatre, and so on).
At a national level, this means recognising publicly that the past is a site of struggle, not a
fixed object to which all members of the nation must identify. As Antze and Lambek write,
"Memory becomes a locus of struggle over the boundary between the individual and the
collective or between distinct interest groups in which power becomes the operative factor"
(Antze and Lambek, 1996: xx). In this context, the analysis of trauma work in post-conflict
situations involves the charting of the dynamic between national appropriations of memory
and individual resistance and acquiescence.
In addition, the calls for punishment of perpetrators (even when this is not pragmatically
possible), or the impossible demands of survivors like those of the Madres, need to be
understood as rituals of closure in themselves. These calls can re-establish the discontinuities
in time for the survivor; that is, they survived, their loved ones did not and will not ever
appear again. In post-conflict societies, angry calls for justice and revenge persist until the
process of trauma work and reintegration is resolved. The rituals which national polities put
into place both hinder and promote individual psychological processes of recovery.
Recognizing the diversity of responses to suffering (including anger and vengeance) ensures
that the demanding and inherently ambivalent psychological processes of grieving the dead
are not wholly appropriated by post-conflict societies using narrow Christian and human
rights discourses of reconciliation and nation-building.
Truth commissions do not heal the nation, restore the collective psyche or categorically deal
with the past. Their value is much more limited and constrained, and lies in creating a
public space in which publicly telling subjective truths, which are but one form of closure
among many, may occur. They may also cause further psychological trauma when
individuals (such as widows) are treated as the social embodiment of the nation, and are
expected to advance at the same pace as the state institutions which are created in their
name, but which are primarily pursuing a national political agenda.

Notes
(1) Space does not permit a thorough discussion of the nature, mandate and structure of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. For more detail, see: Asmal, K., Asmal, L. and

Roberts, R. S., 1996; Burton, M., 1998; Hamber, B. and Kibble, S., forthcoming; Simpson,
G. and van Zyl, P., 1995; Wilson, R. 2000. For the full mandate of the TRC, see the full text
of the Promotion of National Unity Act, No. 34 of 1995, at
http://www.truth.org.za/legal/act9534.htm
(2) For a more detailed discussion of the reparations issue in South Africa, see: Hamber, B.,
1998: http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/publications/conference/thepast/repair.html
Also see the TRC’s Reparation and Rehabilitation Policy in the TRC Final Report, Volume
5, Chapter 5.
(3) Within this chapter we use the TRC’s definition of reparation, which can include
measures in the form of compensation, an ex gratia payment, restitution, rehabilitation or
recognition. To this end our notion of reparation is very broad and not only includes
monetary compensation but also incorporates a range of other reparation strategies. These
include the need for symbolic reparations (for example, erecting headstones, the building of
memorials, and so on), legal and administrative interventions (for example, expunging
criminal records or the issuing of declarations of death), as well as community reparations
(such as programmes for better access to health).
(4) Cecilia Coimbra from Grupo Tortura Nunca Mais (Rio de Janeiro), Interview with
Brandon Hamber, December 1996, Rio de Janeiro. For a fuller discussion on the families in
Brazil, see: Hamber, B., 1997.
(5) There are more than 20 bodies unaccounted for in Northern Ireland, most said to be
Catholics killed by the Republican groups and the (Provisional) Irish Republican Army or
the IRA. The IRA have acknowledged that 12 of the people abducted and killed between
1972 and 1980 were activities committed under its command. See The Irish Times, June 26,
1998, Front Page.
(6) Sandra Peake, Co-ordinator of the WAVE Counseling Centre, Interview with Brandon
Hamber, 27 October, 1998, Belfast.
(7) William McKinney, The News Letter, August 14, 1998, p. 2. William McKinney’s son,
Brian, disappeared in 1978 after being abducted by Republicans in West Belfast.
(8) Joyce Mtimkulu, Interview with Michael Ignatieff, "Getting Away with Murder", Special
Correspondent Programme, BBC2. Joyce Mtimkulu is the mother of Siphiwo, who went
missing in South Africa a decade and a half ago.
(9) For a study of these events in Argentina, see: Malin, A., 1994.

(10) For a discussion of Freud, trauerarbeit and the history of the Holocaust, see Santner, E.,
1992.
(11) Susan van der Merwe, Testimony at the TRC hearings, Klerksdorp, 23 September,
1996.
(12) The military wing of the African National Congress (ANC).
(13) The Madres emerged as an important democratising social movement during
Argentina’s military dictatorship of the late 1980s. These mothers of the disappeared began
by marching around the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, demanding the return of their sons
and daughters taken by the military’s death squads.
(14) See comments by the families of the disappeared in the Irish Times, August 31, 1998, p.
6; The News Letter, August 14, 1998, p. 6; the Irish Times, June 26, 1998, Front Page; and the
statement issued on behalf of the relatives of the disappeared on September 7, 1998.
(15) For a discussion on the importance of truth in the Northern Ireland context, see:
Hamber, B., 1998 and Rolston, B. 1996.
(16) This was confirmed by interviews conducted by Richard Wilson in the Vaal townships
of Sebokeng, Sharpeville and Boipatong, from 1996 to 1998.
(17) "Stabbed man’s ghost haunts our village", report Eric Mashaba and Sylvester Lukhele,
Sunday Times, 29 September, 1993.
(18) Newspaper reports are inconclusive on the exact number of people killed in the
incident, reports ranging from 39 to 46 fatalities. 42 is the figure used by the Nangalembe
family and is therefore the number used in this chapter.
(19) Margaret Nangalembe, Interview with Richard Wilson, 29 November 1996, Sebokeng,
South Africa.
(20) In Argentina two main groups exist. The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo reject all
government attempts to investigate the truth and only want justice. This group split with the
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo – Linea Fundadora in 1986. The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo – Linea
Fundadora, despite initially being against all investigations and truth recovery processes,
now work with the government in investigating disappearances (for example, exhumations)
and accept the reparations offered. See Hamber, B., 1997.
(21) The issue of compensation has only recently been thrust into main focus when the
government agreed in 1995 to compensate the families of the murdered and ‘disappeared’,

in some cases two decades after the ‘disappearances’. The bill was approved by the Brazilian
Congress in September 1995. 136 names of disappeared persons were officially
acknowledged by the government. The number of those considered dead or disappeared is
still contested by some of the families of victims in Brazil. The onus is however on the
families to prove the government was responsible. The group sees this as the government’s
final attempt to buy their silence and close the book on the past, without revealing the true
facts of what happened during the military dictatorship.
(22) For a discussion of several cases where there has been forgiveness between victim and
perpetrator in South Africa, see: Frost, B., 1998 as well as the TRC Final Report, Volume 5,
Chapter 5: "Reconciliation".
(23) Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) chair in Guateng, Lybon Mabaso, telling a
Johannesburg news conference that the TRC was defeating the ends of justice by attempting
to stop the attorney-general from pursuing apartheid-era human rights offenders. In "The
Truth as it was Told", Weekly Mail and Guardian, 23 December, 1997.
(24) Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v. the President of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996.
(25) In sum, the judgement largely argues that amnesty was necessary and pragmatic to
ensure democracy in South Africa, and that hopes for large-scale prosecution were not
viable given the inefficiencies of the court system. It argues that the TRC offered at least
potentially some truth and reparations to a greater number of survivors than the courts
would have. The courts would have offered this to fewer people although the civil claims
would have undoubtedly been larger than the reparations that may be made available
through the TRC. Despite the upholding of the amnesty provisions, the judgement makes it
clear that because perpetrators will be granted amnesty, those found to be victims are
entitled to ‘individually nuanced’ reparations. Nonetheless, the judgement makes an
important rejoinder to this argument, that is, the state can take into consideration the
available resources, the claims of all victims and the competing demands of the government
when deciding what reparation policies to implement. See South African Journal of Human
Rights, 13(2), which has several papers dealing with this ruling.
(26) Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Interview with Michael Ignatieff, "Getting Away with
Murder", Special Correspondent Programme, BBC2.
(27) To some degree, the TRC can be said to embody restorative justice principles at a
national level; however, it is argued that it does not wholly embody the principles of
restorative justice at an individual level. This is because victims in the TRC scenario still do
have the individual capacity to effect the outcome of the amnesty process, and that
reparation is made from the state. There is no obligation on the perpetrator to make direct

amends or offer restitution to the victim in the TRC model. See Hamber, B. and Kibble, S.,
forthcoming. Also see Zehr, H., 1997: 20.
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